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OIL SHOCK: POLICY RESPONSE
AND IMPLEMENTATION
A REPORT OF THE HARVARD ENERGY SECURITY PROGRAM
ALVIN J. ALM and ROBERT J. WEINER, eds.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger. 1984. 239 pp. + xv. $28.00

This volume, the product of a conference held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, appears at a particularly opportune time, when the flow of oil
from the Persian Gulf once again threatens to be interrupted. The major
oil importing nations have achieved considerable progress since the first
oil shock in 1973-74. Consumption has been reduced, supplies from nonOPEC sources increased, an international sharing agreement concluded,
and large inventories accumulated. But one can have little confidence in
our ability to cope the next time until the serious problems that remain
can be resolved. To mention just two:
" the sharing agreement does not take effect until the shortage reaches
7 percent, yet the Iranian Revolution of 1979 caused serious shortages at a level well below that trigger;
" the United States has accumulated a large Strategic Petroleum Reserve, yet neither policies nor procedures for withdrawals are firmly
in place.
The book addresses these, and related issues. Following a wide-ranging
introduction by Alvin L. Alm, it covers three major topics: relevant aspects
of the oil market, oil shocks and macroeconomic policy, and stockpiling
policy. Each part contains three or four papers written by well qualified
scholars and/or policy makers intimately acquainted with the issues. The
result is a set of chapters that maintains the high standards set in the
introduction throughout.
A brief review of 11 chapters by 14 authors (including co-authors) cannot
cover the gamut of issues stemming from a sharp runup of oil prices. They
range from the philosophy on which actions are based (free markets versus
government intervention) to highly technical ones (e.g., alternative methods
of financing stockpiles). There is agreement only that an ostrich policy would
be folly. For the economy, these issues include such basics as inflation, income transfer (between nations, regions, and interest groups), levels of income and employment, and real hardships for lower income groups. All of
these spill over into local, national, and international policymaking and politics. One difficulty is that no set of criteria, however well thought out, can
serve as a definitive guide for policy decisions. Conflicts between different,
equally desirable, objectives are unavoidable; tri-deoffs and compromise are
essential.
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Take the old dilemma of efficiency versus equity, for instance. The
Reagan Administration is committed to letting the market distribute oil
supplies in a future disruption, and the President has vetoed congressional
moves to give him standby allocation powers. Yet, in a crisis, public
pressure is likely to lead to the institution of controls unless alternative
measures have been enacted. Economists agree with the Administration
that controls do more harm than good, which past experience seems to
confirm. Chapter 7 by Michael C. Barth and Edwin Berk, and Chapter
8 by Steven Kelman address ways of avoiding the dilemma by permitting
the market to operate freely and "recycling" funds to offset undesirable
effects. The authors point out the difficulty in selecting among various
possible implementation schemes. Not all desirable criteria (speed, coverage, low cost, etc.) can be met simultaneously. A combination of reduced personal income taxes plus unrestricted grants to the states (to take
care of those not covered but likely to be particularly hard hit) may well
be the best scheme that can be devised. But, as the authors point out,
enacting any such measures takes time. Pre-emergency preparation would
be of great help, yet neither the Administration nor Congress seems ready
to tackle the subject (apart from hearings that were held some time ago).
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is the subject of three chapters,
is the major policy instrument on which the United States relies to counteract the effects of another supply disruption. Currently, it contains some
400 million barrels of crude oil, stored mainly in Salt Domes near the
Gulf Coast. Even if one assumes no physical obstacles (transportation,
processing, etc.) to the Reserve being available where needed, there
remain numerous unresolved questions of when and precisely how to
implement a drawdown. Some methods can cause perverse behavior by
private companies which could nullify the beneficial effects of government
action. Also, the behavior of other Western nations is critical; it could
either counteract or reinforce our measures. Chapter 10 by S. Devarajan
and R. G. Hubbard, and Chapter 11, by Hubbard and Weiner, analyze
these issues in detail.
The authors and editors have tried to keep technical material to a
minimum (e.g., by moving it to an appendix). But readers with limited
knowledge of economic reasoning will find the volume rough going. In
addition to conceptual discussions, many of the chapters present tests of
hypotheses using econometric and other models. Yet students of oil policy,
and decision makers as well, can scarcely ignore the issues with which
the book deals. They are state of the art treatment.
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